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Abstract
The conventional wisdom on nominal anchors is that exchange rate-based inflation stabilizations
lead to economic booms while monetary-based stabilizations lead to recessions. This study finds
strong evidence against this view. Rather than determining the path of economic growth, the
choice of nominal anchor appears to be endogenously determined by the state ofthe economy.
To peg or manage the exchange rate, a high level ofinternational reserves is important,
especially when a government's credibility is low after a period ofhigh inflation. After
controlling for the level of international reserves and the rate ofinflation, growth after
monetary-based stabilizations does not significantly differ from that following exchange rate-
based stabilizations.
'I thank Steve Kamin, Linda Goldberg, Bill Gruben, Ramon Moreno, Mike Pakko,
Alejandro Perez LOpez, David Papell, Oscar Sanchez, Julio Santaella, and Mark Spiegel for
helpful comments and suggestions. I would especially like to thank Carlos Zarazaga, whose
excellent comments and observations were an important motivating factor behind this study. All
remaining errors are solely my responsibility. The views expressed in this paper do flot
necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve BanlCnf Dallas.I. Introduction
One of the most captivating questions in macroeconomics is whether anti-inflation
programs lead to output and employment losses. Utilizing the traditional Phillips curve analysis,
the answer would be yes: reducing inflation does indeed lead to a short-run loss ofemployment
and output. More recently, however, several authors have suggested that the answer to this
question depends inherently on the choice of the nominal anchor. Kiguel and Liviatan (1992),
for example, examine inflation stabilization in several Latin AmeriCan countries and Israel and
report that"...stabilization programs that use the exchange rate as the main nominal anchor are
often associated with a business cycle that begins with a boom and ends with a recession,"
whereas "stabilization programs that use the money supply as the nominal anchor generally
induce the expected Phillips curve result: lower inflation is accompanied by a recession after the
program is implemented.'" Calvo and Vegh (1994) summarize the choice between exchange
rate-based stabilization (ERBS) and monetary-based stabilization (MBS) as one of"recession
now versus later.'"
While not everyone supports the view of a recession now versus later trade-off, there is
typically wide support for the view that fIXing the exchange rate, at least in the early stages of an
inflation stabilization program, can facilitate the reduction of inflation with reduced transitional
costs over just money-based programs (see, for example, Bruno 1993, Dornbusch and Werner
1994, Edwards 1995a, Fischer 1986, and Sachs 1996).
Numerous models have been developed over the last decade to explain this dichotomy
between exchange rate- and monetary-based stabilizations. Dornbusch (1982) and Rodriguez
'Vegh (1992) makes similar observations.
'Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) considers the expansionary effects of ERBS
and the contractionary effects of MBS to be an important stylized fact inflation stabilizations.
See IMF Survey (1995).
1(1982) propose the theory that reducing the rate of exchange-rate devaluation, in addition to
sticky inflation and high capital mobility, would lead to lower real interest rates and, hence, an
economic boom. Calvo (1986) and Calvo and Vegh (1993) explain this behavior as a lack of
credibility. Ifpeople believe that inflation will return, consumption will shift from the future to
the present, leading to increased short-run economic activity. Others note the positive supply
effects of reducing inflation on labor (Roldos 1993) or capital (Roldos 1995, and Uribe 1995).
Rebelo and Vegh (1995) analyze a two-sector, general equilibrium model in which the credibility
effects on demand are augmented by supply-side effects.
A problem with existing theories and stylized facts is that the selection of a stabilization
program is never a simple choice between an exchange rate or monetary anchor. Nor is the
outcome of the two types of stabilization programs as consistent as the stylized facts make them
appear. To use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, a country with credibility problems first
must have some international reserves to defend the exchange rate. Mexico's 1987 exchange
rate-based stabilization, for example, used $7.2 billion of $12.5 billion in reserves in one year to
maintain the policy. In 1995, Mexico's anemic level ofinternational reserves and weakened
credibility would have made it virtually impossible for the country to return to its highly
managed exchange rate regime.
In other words, the choice ofnominal anchor may be endogenously determined by the
state of the economy. Those countries with ample international reserves, higher credibility, and
better prospects for economic growth can pursue exchange rate-based stabilizations. Countries
with fewer international reserves, diminished credibility, and weaker prospects for the future
may have only the option of monetary-based stabilizations.' The observation that economic
'Ofcourse, it may be the case that international reserves are also endogenously determined.
Countries wishing to pursue a fixed exchange rate in the future may first begin to stabilize and
build reserves.
2growth appears to be higher after exchange rate-based stabilizations may simply be the result of
better economic prospects before the stabilization began. Indeed, Edwards (1995b) finds strong
evidence that the greater a country's history of political instability and past inflation, the less
likely is the country to pursue a fixed exchange rate regime. Endogeneity implies that there is
no simple recession now versus later trade-off in the choice of stabilization program.
This paper examines the question ofwhether the choice of nominal anchor, by itself,
matters in affecting a nation's short-run economic growth. With data similar to that used in
previous studies that examine ERBS and MBS (i.e., Kiguel and Liviatan 1992, Vegh 1992, Calvo
and Vegh 1994, and Reinhart and Vegh 1994), this study quantifies the importance and
statistical significance ofchanges in output growth around inflation stabilizations and examines
the likelihood that the choice of stabilization program is endogenously determined. After
controlling for the level of international reserves and inflation, growth after monetary-based
stabilizations does not differ significantly from that following exchange rate-based stabilizations.
II. Empirical Analysis
The following empirical analysis is designed to answer the question ofwhether the choice
of nominal anchor matters, in an ex ante way, in affecting a nation's short-run economic growth.
The choice of nominal anchor may have important effects on other economic variables, such as
the distribution of output or the credibility of future stabilizations, but these effects are not
addressed here.' The primary concern is whether the choice of nominal anchor alters the path
of real output in periods following inflation stabilizations. To address this question, I first
identify the stabilizations to be used in the analysis and discuss some inherent problems in their
'The overall characteristics of international business cycles in fixed and floating exchange
rate regimes is well documented in Baxter and Stockman (1989). They find no evidence to
suggest that the cyclic behavior of real macroeconomic aggregates depends systematically on the
exchange-rate regime.
3classification. Second, I provide a graphical analysis ofgrowth, inflation, and money base growth
around stabilization episodes. Finally, I present regression analysis of cross-country growth
patterns before and after stabilizations and analyze the whether the choice of nominal anchor is
endogenously determined by the state ofthe economy.
II.a. Defining Stabilizations
One of the most difficult tasks in distinguishing the output effects ofinflation
stabilizations is to identify the stabilizations. Because the results ofthis study should allow
comparison with previous studies (i.e., the works of Kiguel and Liviatan 1992, Vegh 1992, Calvo
and Vegh 1994, and Reinhart and Vegh 1994), I have chosen a similar set of major
stabilizations. These previous studies have based their choice of stabilizations on the program's
sustained success in holding down inflation. Ofcourse, this criterion alone could bias the results
of any statistical procedure and is a relevant criticism of previous studies. By choosing, expost,
those countries that have successfully stabilized, these studies may bias the sample toward
concluding that stabilization leads to economic growth. Because the main objective of this
analysis is to determine any significant difference between monetary- and exchange rate-based
stabilizations, bias should not be a large problem as long as the criterion for choosing monetary-
and exchange rate-based stabilizations is the same.
Another difficulty is the problem of dating the stabilization. Does the program begin
when it is announced or when inflation actually starts to decline? Dating a program a year
earlier or later may affect conclusions about the program's success. For example, Uruguay
announced an exchange rate-based stabilization program in October 1978, but inflation had
peaked a year earlier. Did the stabilization begin in 1978 or 19771 To examine the sensitivity
ofthe empirical results to this potential problem, both such dates are analyzed. One
stabilization date is defined by the year in which the program was announced, as defined by
4Calvo and Vegh (1994). The other stabilization date is the year in which inflation actually
peaked, as examined by Easterly (1995). In eight of the 12 exchange rate-based stabilizations
analyzed (Table 1), inflation peaked a year or more before the stabilization program was
announced. Inflation peaked three years prior to the announcement of Chile's 1978 exchange
rate-based stabilization, during its 1975 monetary-based stabilization. Likewise, inflation peaked
two years prior to the announcement ofArgentina's 1991 exchange rate-based stabilization,
during its 1989 monetary-based stabilization.
A related problem is how to distinguish between a monetary- and exchange rate-based
stabilization. Sometimes a country will first stabilize monetary aggregates and then, a few years
later, fix its exchange rate. In 1975, for example, Chile began a monetary-based inflation
stabilization and steadily reduced inflation from 375 percent a year to nearly 10 percent in 1982.
During this period ofdeclining inflation, in 1978, the exchange rate was fIXed. Was the 1978
fixed exchange rate a new stabilization episode or a continuation of the 1975 monetary-based
stabilization? The same problemarises for the Argentinean monetary-based stabilization in
1989 and the subsequent exchange rate-based stabilization in 1991. The 1985 Bolivian monetary-
based stabilization is also difficult to categorize because, although the government was
intervening in the foreign exchange markets, it did not announce a particular exchange rate
policy, nor did it target a particular exchange rate.' These inherent problems of categorization
plague all studies on the subject. Unfortunately, there are no controlled laboratory experiments
of inflation stabilizations. I offer a sensitivity analysis ofhow the results change when defining
'In fact, the question of a strict money-based stabilization can also be raised. Some money-
based stabilizations may begin with an initial one-time increase in the money stock followed by a
decline in the rate of money-growth. Other money-based stabilizations just follow a decline in
the rate of money-growth. The behavior ofeconomic growth, however, may differ between the
two types of money-based stabilizations. See Uribe (1996) for an analysis of these possible
effects.
5stabilization by peak inflation instead of the announcement date'
n.b How Do the Data Look?
Growth Charts 1 and 2 show real GDP growth three years before and three years after
the stabilization, as defined by the announcement date (the first column in Table 1). Data on
yearly real GDP growth are from the Summers and Heston Penn World Tables (version 5.6)
and are augmented by IMF data for the years after 1990.
As one can see by examining the charts, there is a wide variety of experience among
countries that have used the exchange rate to stabilize inflation. Growth usually, but not always,
increases in the year after the stabilization. Nor is growth sustained more than one year after
the stabilization. In three ofthe 12 exchange rate-based stabilization experiences, a decline in
growth occurred the year after stabilization (Brazil 1964, 1986 and Argentina 1991). Eight
stabilization episodes experienced an increase in growth the year after stabilization (Argentina
1967, 1978, and 1985; Mexico 1987; Uruguay 1968, 1978, and 1991; and Israel 1985).' Real GDP
growth did not change much after the stabilization in Chile in 1978. It is interesting to note that
the rate of growth after the Argentina 1991, Brazil 1986, and Chile 1978 stabilizations appears to
be a continuation of a change that began at least one to two years earlier.
For the six monetary-based stabilizations, the picture looks a bit more uniform in the
year after the stabilization. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, real GDP tends to increase
after MBS. Five of the six monetary-based stabilizations show higher growth; only Bolivia in
'The cases of Argentina 1989 and Chile 1975 are excluded from the set of exchange rate-
based stabilizations as defined by peak inflation (see Table 1) but are included in the set of
exchange rate-based stabilizations as defined by the announcement date. This is because the
exchange rate-based stabilization date as defined by peak inflation corresponds to the earlier
date ofmoney-based stabilization and cannot be included as an independent stabilization.
'In terms of peak inflation, two stabilization episodes (Argentina 1977 and Brazil 1964)
experienced a decline in growth and six experienced an increase in growth (Argentina 1985,
Brazil 1985, Mexico 1987, Uruguay 1968 and 1977, and Israel 1984).
61985 appears to fit the stylized facts ofa monetary-based stabilization.
Chart 3a summarizes the pattern ofreal GOP growth around exchange rate- and
monetary-based stabilizations.
8 Growth increases in the year after stabilization for both types of
stabilizations. Although MBS starts from lower (indeed, negative) growth before stabilization,
growth is higher in subsequent years. As the chart also indicates, the median of the sample
follows quite closely the mean.
Chart 3b also summarizes the pattern of real GOP growth around monetary- and
exchange rate-based stabilizations, but in this chart peak inflation around the announcement
date of the program dermes the year of stabilization. In addition, the exchange rate-based
stabilizations of Chile 1978 and Argentina 1991 (where inflation peaked during previous money-
based stabilizations) are excluded. When using peak inflation as the date of stabilization, the
pattern ofreal GOP growth is even more alike between MBS and ERBS. In both programs,
growth tends to bottom out during the year of stabilization and then improves. However, the
level ofgrowth that precedes and follows exchange rate-based programs is still much higher than
the level of growth around monetary-based programs.
Inflation, moneybase growth., anddevaluation. Analysis of the relationship among
stabilization, inflation, money base growth, and devaluation is reflected in Charts 4 and 5. One
of the most dramatic differences between exchange rate- and monetary-based stabilizations is in
the rate of inflation. The median inflation rate during the year of stabilization for monetary-
based stabilizations is 2,938 percent, while for exchange rate-based stabilizations it is 132
percent. This pattern, which has not been emphasized in the previous literature, is consistent
with the hypothesis that the choice of stabilization is endogenously determined by the state of
the economy.
'The format for this chart was based on Easterly (1995).
7To peg or manage the exchange rate, a high level ofinternational reserves is useful,
especially when the government's credibility is low after a period of high inflation. Those
economies that experienced severe instability before a stabilization may not have the
international reserves to fix or manage the exchange rate, so they choose a monetary-based
stabilization. This appears to be the case. As shown in Chart 6, international reserves as a
share of GDP the year before and during exchange rate-based stabilizations are nearly twice as
high as those before monetary-based stabilizations. Reserves as a share of GDP at the time of
exchange rate-based stabilizations are slightly above their long-run average from 1960-94. For
monetary-based stabilizations, they are less than 40 percent of their long-run average.
Another important feature of ERBS is that inflation and the rate of money growth
typically peak one to two years before the year the stabilization was announced. This suggests
that some type of stabilization may take place before the announced exchange rate program.
Argentina 1967, 1978, and 1991; Chile 1978; Uruguay 1978, 1991; and Israel 1985 all had
inflation and money base growth rates that peaked a year or more before the year of the
announced ERBS. Chile 1978 and Argentina 1991 are certainly cases where monetary
stabilizations were implemented several years earlier.
Charts 7a and 7b summarize the path ofmoney base growth around stabilizations. Chart
7a shows money base growth centered around the announcement date ofthe programs and 7b
shows the same but centered around the peak in inflation. Basically, the charts show that
inflation peaks in the same year that the money base growth peaks, regardless ofthe type of
stabilization (Chart 7b). The only difference between the stabilizations is that exchange rate-
based programs are typically announced two years after the peak in inflation and money base
growth (Chart 7a).
As has been discussed by Bruno (1991), Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), Vegh (1992), and
8others, in exchange rate-based stabilizations, the rate of inflation tends to faIl more slowly than
the rate of devaluation, which causes a real exchange rate appreciation. Not so widely known,
however, is that the same is true for monetary-based stabilizations. In other words, real
exchange rates tend to appreciate after both monetary- and exchange rate-based stabilizations.
With the exception of Brazil 1990, all monetary-based stabilizations are followed by inflation
falling more slowly than the exchange rate. Chart 8 summarizes the pattern of real exchange
rate appreciation after monetary- and exchange rate-based stabilization.
III. Regression Analysis
The purpose ofusing regression analysis is to identify any statistically consistent
relationship between the type ofinflation stabilization followed and the behavior ofreal output.
The hope is to capture any empirical regularity in output growth around stabilizations so that
some distinguishing features ofmonetary- and exchange rate-based stabilizations can be
identified.
The methodology used in this section is a variant of that used by Reinhart and Vegh
(1994) and Easterly (1995). Real GDP growth is regressed on a set of dummy variables, which
represent the years before and after stabilization, to determine ifthere is any above or below
trend real GDP growth around the year of stabilization.
Fixed-effects equations were run for both types of stabilization programs utilizing the
entire pooled cross-country data set. The data cover the years 1960 to 1994. Three years before
and three years after the stabilization are examined, as well as the year of stabilization itself.
The equations estimated are
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whereY is real GOP growth, CountTyDUMi are country i's fixed effect, ERBSDUMj
(2)
and MBSDUMj are dummy variables for an exchange rate- and monetary-based stabilization and
are equal to 1 in year j and zero otherwise. «, 8, ~,and y, are estimated coefficients, and /L
and € are iid error terms.
Table 2 shows the regression analysis for growth patterns before and after stabilizations.'
The first two columns in the table examine the behavior of aggregate real GOP growth around
stabilization dates that are defmed by peak inflation. The'fIrst column looks at the behavior of
real GDP for monetary-based stabilizations (equation 1), and the second column examines the
behavior of real GOP for exchange rate-based stabilizations (equation 2).
For at least one year before monetary-based stabilizations, aggregate real GOP growth is
significantly less than its long-run trend. In contrast, the years before exchange rate-based
stabilizations are not marked by aggregate real GOP growth that is significantly less than the
trend rate. In other words, the economies that followed a monetary-based stabilization were in
much worse shape before stabilizing than those that picked an exchange rate-based stabilization
(this was also seen visually in Charts 3a and 3b). This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis
that the choice of nominal anchor is endogenously determined. In economies that have
experienced severe declines in output before stabilization, international reserves may not be
available, so, from the government's perspective, the best strategy for inflation stabilization is
monetary-based stabilization. Similarly, some sort of monetary or fIscal stabilization may
'Because autocorrelation in the error term was detected, Park's method for fIrst-order
autocorrelation correction in panel data was implemented. The SAS procedure for time-series
cross-section data analysis, PROC TSCS, was used with Park's method.
10precede exchange rate-based stabilizations, so the actual output response after ERBS is small.
For example, the 1975 Chilean monetary stabilization preceded its 1978 exchange rate-based
stabilization, after which growth did not change appreciably.
In terms of determining ifthere is a "recession now versus later" trade-off, the crucial
question is: What is the pattern ofgrowth in the years following the stabilization? For both
types of stabilizations, growth during the year of stabilization is less than the trend rate of
growth. Looking at the fIrst year after stabilization, however, one can see that growth improved
after both exchange rate-based and monetary-based stabilizations. Growth after exchange rate-
based stabilizations was above trend, although not significantly different from the trend. Growth
after monetary-based stabilization was still below trend, but greater than the growth rate during
the year of the stabilization. Contrary to the stylized facts of monetary- and exchange rate-
based stabilizations, there does not appear to be a significant pattern offurther decline after
monetary-based stabilizations. Both policies can produce improved growth after stabilizing
inflation.
The fact that growth is signifIcantly below trend after monetary-based stabilizations is not
necessarily an indication that money-based stabilization leads to recession. Growth is closer to .
trend the year after the stabilization than during the year ofstabilization. In fact, growth
continues to improve for at least three years after stabilization.
How much do these results depend on the definition ofstabilization? To determine the
robustness of these results, I include the announced date ofstabilization as defined by Calvo and
Vegh (1994). The results when using this defmition are shown in columns 3 and 4. There is
little difference between the results in columns 3 and 4 and those in columns 1 and 2. There is
a slight increase in growth after the fIrst year ofboth exchange rate-based and monetary-based
stabilizations, and growth after exchange rate-based stabilizations becomes significantly greater
11than the trend in the first year after stabilization."
Table 3 shows results of the same experiment as Table 2 but with per capita real GDP
growth rather than aggregate real GDP growth as the dependent variable. The results using per
capita real GDP growth are essentially the same as those using aggregate real GDP growth.
I1I.a. Endogeneity in the Choice ofStabilization Program
Although economic growth improves after both exchange rate- and monetary-based
inflation stabilizations, the absolute level of growth is lower before and after monetary-based
stabilizations. The hypothesis presented earlier suggested that perhaps the choice of
stabilization is an endogenous one. Governments with little inflation-fighting credibility and no
international reserves may have to choose a monetary-based program. In models where a
country's choice to follow a fixed exchange rate represents a greater commitment to lower
inflation than simply establishing a monetary growth target, the issue of feasibility seems to be
ignored. In some models, it is assumed that the government decision maker bears a fixed cost
of deviating from an exchange rate commitment, such as a loss of offices or a loss of market
confidence. In other models, a fIXed exchange rate may signal something about a government's
preference for inflation." These ideas imply that countries with weak credibility but a true
desire to achieve lower inflation would find an exchange rate-based stabilization a superior
strategy to follow because economic agents more quickly lower their inflation expectations. This
is the reasoning behind Jeffrey Sachs' (1996) advocacy ofpegged exchange rates for transition
economies such as those of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
"Another test ofrobustness was done that changed the announcement year of stabilization
to the following year if the announcement was made in the last quarter ofthe year. So, for
example, Mexico's December 1987 stabilization was classified as a 1988 stabilization. The basic
results, however, were not altered with this change.
"For example, see Devarajan and Rodrik (1992). For a general discussion of
macroeconomic policy and credibility issues, see Persson and Tabellini (1990).
12It is not clear, however, why a country with a history of high inflation should be able to
more credibly commit itself to fixing the exchange rate than to maintaining a monetary growth
rule. In fact, attempting to stabilize inflation with a fIXed exchange rate but no international
reserves and a history of price instability is probably less credible than a monetary growth rule.
The all-or-nothing nature of the fixed exchange rate commitment implies that it has little chance
ofbeing kept." As a result, the credibility of the inflation-fighting program and, hence, the
choice of nominal anchor, may be endogenously determined by the'state ofthe economy.
The question addressed in this section is: After controlling for inflation and the level of
international reserves, is the level of economic growth after monetary-based programs
significantly less than that of exchange rate-based programs? Ifthe level of international
reserves and the rate ofinflation can predict a monetary-based stabilization, the inclusion of
these factors in the growth equation may reduce or eliminate the differential growth rates
between monetary- and exchange rate-based stabilizations. Monetary-based stabilizations may
not cause low growth but may themselves be chosen in times of low growth and low
international reserves."
Before examining the role of international reserves and inflation in determining money-
based stabilizations, I examine a benchmark model of intervention. The model is designed to
12Drazen (1996) makes the important point that ifthe public takes into consideration the
environment in which a "tough" policy is followed, than a tough today may not signal more
credibility but may be associated with less credibility. For example, if sticking to a fixed
exchange rate regime today increases the unemployment rate and political problems tomorrow,
then the credibility the public assigns to the policy may fall because the political environment of
policymaker is taken into account. Drazen notes that "today's choices affect tomorrow's
environment in such a way that playing tough may lower the credibility ofa tough policy."
"Including inflation and international reserves as the only factors determining the type of
stabilization program is a very stringent test. Other factors, such as fiscal spending, market
liberalization, and deregulation, are certainly important elements in determining movements in
economic growth and may also differ between types of stabilization programs.
13address the question ofwhether the pattern ofgrowth differs between stabilizations. It differs
from the previous analysis in two important ways. First, lagged values of the growth are
included in the equation to explicitly account for the dynamic behavior of economic growth.
Second, a dummy variable for the year after all stabilizations is included along with a dummy
variable for the year afterjust monetary-based stabilizations. By including both dummy
variables in the equation, examining the coefficient on monetary based-stabilizations provides a
simple test ofwhether growth differs between the two types of stabilizations. The benchmark
intervention model under consideration is the following:"
n
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WhereY is real GDP growth, CountryDUM, is country i's flXed effect, ALLDUM is a dummy
variable for all inflation stabilization programs and is equal to 1 in the year after the
stabilization and zero otherwise, MBSDUM is a dummy variable for only monetary-based
stabilizations and is equal to 1 in theyear after the stabilization and zero otherwise, '" and ~ are
estimated coefficients, and J.L is an lid error term.
Ifgrowth theyear after monetary-based stabilizations is significantly lower than exchange
rate-based stabilizations, the coefficient on MBSDUM, ~" should be negative and significantly
different from zero.
~] and ~,indicatethe growth dynamics after shocks. It is expected that the effects of
shocks are temporary, which implies that 0 < I~] + ~,I <1. Because growth is expected to
improve gradually after negative shocks (or decline after positive shocks), it is expected that
0< ~]<1. ~,may either be positive or negative, depending on whether growth monotonically
"See Vandaele (1983, chapter 14) for a description of similar intervention models.
14approaches its trend or overshoots it.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show the estimation results of equation 3 using peak
inflation and the announcement of the program as alternate stabilization dates. As expected, 0
< IP, +P,I <1 and 0< P, <1, implying that the effects of shocks are temporary and gradually
return to trend. Because P, <0, growth overshoots its trend rate and then returns to it. No
signs of autocorrelation are detected across equations.
The positive coefficient on ALLDUM, which is significant in the case of stabilizations
defined by the announcement date, suggests that average growth the year after all stabilizations
is above trend, which is consistent with the findings of Bruno and Easterly (1995). The negative
and significant coefficient on MBSDUM suggests that growth the year after monetary-based
stabilizations is significantly below that of exchange rate-based stabilizations. These results
confirm that the level ofgrowth the year after monetary-based stabilizations is significantly less
than that of exchange rate-based stabilizations.
The essential question is, however: How much ofthat difference in growth can be
accounted for by the government's endogenous choice ofthe inflation-fighting program? Are
monetary-based inflation stabilization programs typically chosen in periods of higher inflation
and lower international reserves? To address this question, columns 3 and 4 and columns 5
and 6 in Table 4 include contemporaneous and lagged inflation rates and the share of
international reserves in GDP. If the rate of inflation and the level of international reserves are
important determinates ofthe choice of stabilization, including these variables in the regression
equation may eliminate the significance of the monetary-based intervention dummy variable.
Before the results are presented, however, it is important to remember the difference
between the date of stabilization defined by the announcement date and the peak inflation date.
The announcement date refers to the date that the government publicly committed to a
15program. In the case of exchange rate-based programs, this date refers to the date that an
explicit exchange rate commitment was made. In other words, it is the date the government
committed itself to defending the exchange rate with its stock international reserves. As
mentioned earlier, the announcement date for exchange rate-based stabilizations does not always
coincide with the date ofpeak inflation (indeed, in most cases it does not) because ofsteps
taken in previous periods to reduce inflation by other means. International reserves are
expected to be important only in the decision to fIX the exchange rate, and not in the decision to
merely reduce inflation. Thus, it is the announcement date that is relevant for examining the
endogeneity of the choice of program.
As shown in columns 3 and 4 in Table 4, the inclusion ofcontemporaneous inflation
(INF,) in the model substantially reduces the significance ofmonetary-based stabilizations.
15
Monetary-based stabilizations take place in periods ofhigher inflation than do exchange rate-
based stabilizations. As expected, these results hold only for stabilizati.on dates defined by the
announced commitment to fixed exchange rates or monetary stability. Lagged inflation (INF,.,)
does not appear to playa significant role in determining growth or in altering the significance of
monetary-based stabilizations.
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4 include the contemporaneous and lagged share of
international reserves in GDP. Consistent with the hypothesis that international reserves are an
important element behind the government's willingness to pursue a fIXed-exchange rate policy,
we see that the lagged share of international reserves in GDP (SRES,,) dramatically reduces the
significance of the monetary-based intervention dummy variable. As before, this result holds
only holds for stabilizations defined by the announced commitment to fixed exchange rates or
"All the results ofTable 4 are essentially the unchanged when money base growth is
substituted for inflation.
16monetary stability. Once the endogenous determinates of stabilizations are controlled for, there
does not appear to be a significant difference in the level of growth between monetary- and
exchange rate-based stabilizations.
A more direct way determining whether the choice of stabilization is endogenous is by
examining whether the type ofstabilization can be predicted by the size of international
reserves. The question is: Are exchange rate-based stabilizations more likely to be chosen in
countries with relatively higher or lower international reserves?"
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Where T=1 is an exchange rate-based stabilization (ERE), T=2 is no stabilization (N), and T=O
is a monetary-based stabilization (ME). SRESQ is the quartile value of the share of
international reserves in GDP. SRESQ takes the value of4 if the share ofinternational reserves
"Given the previous analysis, it is likely that past inflation also would be important in
predicting the type ofnominal anchor. However, due to the small frequency of observations on
exchange rate- and monetary-based stabilizations, and large number offixed effects, the
equation's degrees of freedom were too small to estimate the full model. In a separate
multinomial analysis that included ouly inflation, I found that higher inflation was negatively
related to the choice ofa exchange rate-based stabilization but was not statistically significant.
17See Greene (1993, 666-67) for a discussion ofmultinomiallogit models.
17in GDP falls in the highest quartile of observations; it takes the value of 3 in the third quartile,
and so on. The same data set described earlier is used.
As seen in Table 5, the share of international reserves in GDP is an important and
significant predictor of the type of stabilization. For example, moving up one quartile in the
share of international reserves in GDP (SRESQ), say from the second quartile to third quartile,
would increase the probability of an exchange rate-based over a monetary-based stabilization by
a factor of 9.1 ( d(PERB!PM' )!dSRESQISRESQ-'= e·1.326 + /.$4')" *1.549 =' 9.1).
IV. Concluding Remarks
At first glance, many of the results presented in this study are not inconsistent with
previous studies on the choice of nominal anchor. Indeed, like previous work, this study
indicates that the rate of economic growth is lower after monetary-based stabilizations than after
exchange rate-based stabilizations. What is different about this study, however, is the analysis of
the dynamics of economic growth and the potential endogeneity in the choice of the stabilization
program. Ifthe choice of a monetary versus exchange rate-based stabilization is endogenously
determined by the level of international reserves and the height ofpast inflation, and ifthese
factors are highly correlated with the state ofthe economy and prospects for future growth, then
it is likely that the economic environment determines the type of stabilization. The evidence
suggests that this is the case.
In general, the economies of those countries that choose monetary-based stabilizations
appear to be in much worse shape before inflation stabilization than those that choose exchange
rate-based stabilization. In the years prior to monetary-based stabilization, economic growth is
lower, international reserves are lower, and inflation is higher than in the years prior to
exchange rate-based stabilizations. Because a high level ofinternational reserves is important
when a government wants to fix its exchange rate, it is only natural that governments would opt
18for exchange rate-based stabilizations only when international reserves are relatively high. It
may also be the case that governments stabilize inflation and deliberately build reserves prior to
managing the exchange rate. In fact, money base growth tends to peak one to two years before
exchange rate-based stabilizations. Growth after monetary-based stabilizations is not
significantly different from exchange rate-based stabilizations when the analysis controls for the
level of international reserves and the rate ofinflation, . Contrary to the "recession-now-versus-
later" hypothesis, the growth dynamics of monetary-based stabilizations are similar to those of
exchange rate-based stabilizations-that is, growth improves after both types ofstabilization.
An important avenue for future research is to formally endogenize the choice of nominal
anchor and explore how other factors, such as a country's susceptibility to external shocks,
influence the choice of stabilization plan. Ultimately, the question ofpolicy credibility and its
relationship (or lack of relationship) to the choice ofnominal anchor is what lies at the heart of
the debate between exchange rate- and monetary-based stabilization.
19References
Baxter, Marianne, and Alan C. Stockman (1989), "Business Cycles and the Exchange-Rate
Regime: Some International Evidence," Journal ofMonetary Economics 23: 377-400.
Bruno, Michael (1991), "High Inflation and the Nominal Anchors of an Open Economy,"
Princeton Essays in International Finance, no. 193 (June).
____--(1993), Crisis, Stabilization, and Economic Refonn: Therapy by Consensus
(Oxford: Clarendon Press).
_____, and William Easterly (1995), "Inflation and Long-Run Growth," NBER Working
paper no. 5209 (August).
Calvo, Guillermo A. (1986), ''Temporary Stabilization: Predetermined Exchange Rates," Journal
ofPolitical Economy 94:1319-29.
__-=_~~-=_'and Carlos A. Vegh (1993), "Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization under
Imperfect Credibility," in Helmut Frisch and Andreas Worgotter (eds.), Open Economy
Macroeconomics (London: MacMillan) 3-28.
____~---,and (1994), "Inflation Stabilization and Nominal
Anchors," Contemporary Economic Policy 3 (April): 35-45.
Devarajan, Shantanayan, and Dani Rodrik (1992), "Do the Benefits of Fixed Exchange Rates
Outweigh Their Costs? The CFA Zone in Mrica," in Ian Goldin and Alan Winters
(eds.), Open Economies: Structural Adjustment andAgriculture (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Dornbusch, Rudiger (1982), "Stabilization Policies in Developing Countries: What Have We
Learned?" World Development, 10: 701-8.
___~_~__, and Alejandro Werner (1994), "Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and No
Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 253-315.
Drazen, Allan (1996), "Policy Signaling in the Open Economy: A Re-examination," Working
Paper 19, University ofMaryland, March.
Edwards, Sebastian (1995a), "Exchange Rates, Inflation and Disinflation: Latin American
Experiences," in Sebastian Edwards (ed.), Capital Controls, Exchange Rates and Monetary
Policy in the World Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press).
___.,.-_---,--,,--, (1995b), "Exchange Rate Anchors and Inflation: A Political Economy
Approach," in Sylvester Eijffinger and Harry Huizinga (eds.), Positive Political Economy:
Theory and Evidence, (New York: John Wiley & Sons).
Easterly, William (1995), "When Is Stabilization Expansionary?" mimeo, the World Bank.
20Fischer, Stanley (1986), "Exchange Rate versus Monetary Targets in Disinflation," In Indexing,
Inflation and Economic Policy, by Stanley Fischer. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
Greene, William H. (1993), Econometric Analysis (New York: Macmillan).
IMF Survey (1995), "Using Exchange Rate Anchors in Adjustment Programs: When and
How?" November 20, 361-63.
Kiguel, Miguel, and Nissan Liviatan (1992), "The Business Cycle Associated with Exchange Rate
Based Stabilization, " The World Bank Economic Review, 6(2): 279-305.
Persson, Torten, and Guido Tabellini (1990), Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics
(New York: Harwood).
Rebelo, Sergio, and Carlos A. V6gh (1995), "Real Effects ofExchange-Rate-Based
Stabilizations: An Analysis of Competing Theories," NBER Macroeconomics Annual,
(Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic.Research).
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Carlos A. V6gh (1994), "Inflation Stabilization in Chronic Inflation
Countries: The Empirical Evidence," mimeo, IMF.
Rodriguez, Carlos A. (1982), "The Argentine Stabilization Plan of December 20th," World
Development, 10: 801-11.
Roldos, Jorge (1993), "On Credible Disinflation," Working Paper 93/90 (Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund).
_______ (1995), "Supply-Side of Disinflation Programs," IMF StaffPapers, 42: 158-83.
Sachs, Jeffrey (1996), "Economic Transition and the Exchange-Rate Regime," American
Economic Review, 86: 147-52.
Uribe, Martin (1995), "Exchange-Rate-based Inflation Stabilization: The Initial Real Effects of
Credible Plans," International Finance Discussion Papers no. 503, (Washington, DC:
Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System).
__--,~-_(1996), "Comparing The Welfare Costs and the Initial Dynamics ofAlternative
Temporary Stabilization Policies," International Finance Discussion Papers no. 539,
(Washington, DC: Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System).
Vandaele, Walter (1983), Applied Time Series and Box-Jenkins Models (Orlando, Fla.:
Academic Press).






































18According to Reinhart and Vegh (1994).
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19Inflation began declining two years earlier after the monetary-based stabilization in 1989.
2OInflation began declining three years earlier after the monetary-based stabilization in 1975.
22Table 2
Statistical Significance of Growth Patterns Before and After Stabilizations
(Pooled Cross-Sectional Data with Parks Correction for Autocorrelation)
gr p
type of stabilization.
Aggregate GDP Growth Aggregate GDP Growth
Monetary- Exchange Monetary- Exchange




-3 -1.505 -0.549 -3.054 -3.495
(-0.88) (-0.41) (-1.81) (-2.68)
-2 -2.535 1.612 -4.555 -0.394
(-1.47) (1.14) (-2.65) (-0.28)
-1 -7.183 -2.078 -6.440 -3.598
(-4.17) (-1.44) (-3.77) (-2.54)
0 -7.383 -2.540 -9.297 -1.072
(-4.07) (-1.76) (-5.42) (-0.79)
+1 -7.166 1.015 -4.633 3.059
(-4.16) (0.73) (-2.70) (2.07)
+2 -2.902 2.164 -0.964 2.732
(-1.66) (1.46) (-0.55) (1.77)
+3 2.209 1.199 1.976 -0.522
(1.06) (0.80) (0.95) (-0.38)
Observations 186 186 186 186
Note: t-values are ill arentheses. FIXed effects re eSSlOns were run for each
23Table 3
Statistical Significance of Growth Patterns Before and After Stabilizations
(Pooled Cross-Sectional Data with Parks Correction for Autocorrelation)
gr p
type of stabilization.
Per Capita GDP Growth Per Capita GDP Growth
Monetary- Exchange Monetary- Exchange




-3 -1.335 0.880 -2.729 -3.294
(-0.81) (0.62) (-1.65) (-2.38)
-2 -2.648 2.016 -4.847 0.012
(-1.57) (1.34) (-2.89) (0.01)
-1 -7.777 -1.929 -6.818 -3.798
(-4.63) (-1.26) (-4.06) (-2.52)
0 -7.333 -2.409 -9.230 -0.962
(-4.18) (-1.56) (-5.51) (-0.66)
+1 -7.015 1.101 -4.916 2.693
(-4.37) (0.74) (-2.93) (1.71)
+2 -3.373 2.481 -1.249 3.056
(-1.99) (1.56) (-0.73) (1.87)
+3 1.710 1.321 1.480 -0.445
(0.87) (0.84) (0.75) (-0.30)
Observations 186 186 186 186
Note: (-values are m arentheses. FlXed effects re eSSlOns were run for each
24Table 4
Intervention Analysis ofGrowth Patterns Around Stabilizations
(Pooled Cross-Sectional Data with Fixed Effects)
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth
Peak Inflation Announce- Peak Inflation Announce~ Peak Inflation Announce-
ment ment ment
i\_l 0.238 0.250 0.206 0.223 0.182 0.199
(3.97) (4.11) (3.40) (3.60) (2.97) (3.20)
Yt-2 -0.120 -0.099 -0.128 -0.120 -0.124 -0.117
(-2.04) (-1.68) (-2.15) (-2.00) (-2.09) (-1.96)
ALLDUM 1.032 3.637 0.852 3.508 0.611 3.287
(0.63) (2.21) (0.52) (2.14) (0.38) (2.02)
MBSDUM -6.182 -5.257 -7.373 -3.759 -6.415 -2.899
(-2.35) (-1.98) (-2.29) (-1.15) (-2.00) (-0.89)
INFt -0.088 -0.073 -0.084 -0.070
(-2.49) (-2.08) (-2.41) (-2.00)
INFt _1 0.035 -0.034 -0.030 -0.039
(0.73) (-0.72) (-0.64) (-0.81)
SRESt -0.024 -0.036
(-0.17) (-0.25)
SRESt _1 0.288 0.308
(1.91) (2.03)
Observations 292 292 292 292 286 286
Ji2 0.163 0.166 0.173 0.175 0.195 0.194
LM test for 0.471 0.745 0.458 1.521 0.747 0.122
autocorrelation
Note: t-values are In parentheses. FIXed enects regresslOns were run for each type of
stabilization. This LM test is distributed as a x.' with one degree offreedom. The critical value
for the test at the 5 percent significance level is 3.84.
25Table 5
Multinomial Logit Analysis:
Predicting Stabilizations by the Level ofInternational Reserves
(Pooled Cross-Sectional Data with Fixed Effects)
p ~ ~ p ~
stabilization, and PMB is the probabili~ of a monetary-based stabilization.
Dependent Independent Coefficient t-ratio Significance
variable variable level
In(PERB/PMB ) SRESQ 1.549 2.888 0.004
In(PN/PMB ) 0.727 7.743 0.081
Observations 305
PN IS the robabtll ot no sta atlOn,P, IS the roba 01 an eXChange rate-baseo
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